Anti-trust and the ‘Beckerian Proposition’: the Effects of Investigation and Fines on Cartels by Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Wandschneider, Frederick
        
Citation for published version:
Chowdhury, SM & Wandschneider, F 2018, Anti-trust and the ‘Beckerian Proposition’: the Effects of
Investigation and Fines on Cartels. in V Tremblay, E Schroeder & C Tremblay (eds), Handbook of Behavioral
Industrial Organization., 14, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp. 368-403.
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is a draft chapter / article. The final version is available in Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization
edited by Victor Tremblay, Elizabeth Shroeder and Carol Tremblay, published in 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/978XXXXXXXXXX.000XX
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for private
use only.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
1 
 
Antitrust and the 'Beckerian Proposition': the Effects 
of Investigation and Fines on Cartels* 
 
Subhasish M. Chowdhury a and Frederick Wandschneider b 
a School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and Centre for 
Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK 
b CEG Europe, Königsallee 92A, 40212 Düsseldorf, Germany 
 
This version: 30 January 2017 
 
 
Abstract 
To deter and punish illegal collusions antitrust authorities run costly investigations and levy fines 
on detected and convicted wrongdoers. According to Becker (1968) the magnitude of fines and the 
detection rates are substitutable in their deterrence effect. We investigate this proposition through 
a market experiment, and study the effects of different fine and detection rate combinations (with 
constant expected fines) on cartel activity, prices and cartel stability. Our results show that in the 
absence of a leniency program, complying with the Beckerian Proposition, detection rates and 
fines are indeed substitutable in deterring cartels. With a leniency program, however, due to 
behavioral bias a regime that embodies low detection rate and high fine lowers the overall 
incidence of cartelization. The market price in this regime is also significantly lower than in a high 
detection rate low fine regime. Finally, irrespective of the presence of a leniency program, the 
different detection rate – fine combinations do not affect the cartel stability. These findings indicate 
that antitrust agencies can rely on behavioral biases to economize on enforcement costs and 
achieve a higher degree of deterrence by reducing investigative efforts and increasing the fine 
level. 
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“Whatsoever evil it is possible for man to do for the advancement of his own private and 
personal interest at the expense of the public interest, that evil, sooner or later, he will do, 
unless by some means or other, intentional or otherwise, prevented from doing it.”   
- Jeremy Bentham (1830) 
1. Introduction 
Bentham’s wisdom, from almost two centuries ago, is still relevant for all aspects of 
criminal behavior. Hence, deterrence of such behavior is still an important issue. Becker (1968) 
makes a seminal contribution in this aspect that is often termed as the ‘Beckerian Proposition’. 
The Proposition assumes that criminals are perfectly rational. This means that individuals base 
their decisions on expected benefits and costs. The expected cost [𝐸(𝐶)] of crime equals the 
probability of apprehension/conviction (ρ) times the fine (𝔽): 𝐸(𝐶)  =  ρ𝔽.  For the rational 
criminal only the expected cost matters and hence ρ and 𝔽 are perfectly substitutable.  That is, 
crime deterrence is the same for any ρ and 𝔽 combination that produces the same 𝐸(𝐶). 
Consider the specific case of a market where illegal collusion is possible. A central task of 
antitrust authorities there is to prevent firms from wrongdoing. The authorities do so by imposing 
fines on detected cartel members. A fully rational or self-interested firm will be affected only by 
the expected cost of litigation. To deter firms from engaging in misconduct, it is necessary that the 
expected cost of collusion exceeds the economic gains from participating in the same (cf. Ehrlich, 
1973). As the economic gain, in general, lies outside the direct control of antitrust legislation, 
policy makers are left with the expected cost that can be manipulated in two ways: increase the 
likelihood of detection, or increase the severity of the imposed fine.  
According to the Beckerian Proposition stated above, the magnitude of fines and the 
likelihood of detection are substitutable in their deterrence effect and hence it is optimal to impose 
a high level of fines with minimal investment in costly detection. In this study we examine this 
Proposition by means of a market experiment, and investigate how the magnitude of the fine levied 
on a firm and the likelihood of antitrust punishment affect the choice to participate and engage in 
an illegal cartel. It is important to test this, since evidence from behavioral economics indicates 
that the behavior of economic agents is not always perfectly rational.1  A common finding is that 
                                                 
1 For a review of the evidence, see Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) and Angner and Loewenstein (2007). For a 
discussion of the link between behavioral economics and antitrust, see Bailey (2015).     
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some people make errors when dealing uncertain events (i.e., settings that involve probabilities).2  
For boundedly rational individuals (Simon 1955; Spiegler, 2011), fines may be easier to 
understand than probabilities.  If subjects suffer from this form of cognitive limitation, then 𝔽 and 
ρ would not be perfect substitutes; subjects may put more weight on 𝔽 than ρ.  Thus, one of the 
goals of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that subject behavior is consistent with perfect 
rationality, such that 𝔽 and ρ are perfect substitutes.  If this hypothesis is rejected, it suggests that 
subjects in this study suffer from behavioral bias. 
These analyses have very many practical implications. Antitrust authorities in different 
countries are recently experimenting to find an optimal punishment for antitrust infringements. In 
the United States the Sentencing Commission is undertaking a review of its sentencing guidelines 
with a focus on corporate fine provisions, and the UK Competition and Market Authorities' chief 
executive announced a "robust programme of enforcement, which includes imposing serious 
penalties on infringing businesses where appropriate", which will "seek to maximize the deterrent 
effect of this activity" (CMA, 2014).3 
The reasoning behind such a policy movement is simple: the antitrust authorities 
economize on the cost of enforcement by committing fewer resources to the detection of a crime, 
while aiming to achieve the same deterrence effect through an offsetting increase in the fines levied 
upon wrongdoers. This relates to the aforementioned Beckerian Proposition. This area of academic 
literature begins with Becker (1968) and is extended to risk-averse agents by Polinsky and Shavell 
(1979). Most recently Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2013) use a non-expected utility framework and 
show that the Beckerian Proposition holds also under rank-dependent utility and cumulative 
prospect theory.4 
The application of the Beckerian Proposition in antitrust policy, phrased by Kolm (1973) 
as “hang offenders with probability zero”, is not uncontested. Block and Sidak (1980), for 
                                                 
2 Many examples can be found in Kahneman and Tversky (1981), Korobkin and Ulen (2000), and Lee and McCrary 
(2006).   
3 Other jurisdictions in which changes in the fine levels were debated include Germany where on June 25, 2013 the 
Federal Cartel Office announced new guidelines for calculating fines that may lead to higher fines. Before closing, 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the United Kingdom, which was facing a 5% yearly budget reduction that may 
well have affected their ability to commit resources to costly investigations, increased the fine imposed on businesses 
in case of an infringement of competition law (OFT, 2013).  
4 Cumulative Prospect Theory is a generalization of the standard Prospect Theory. Unlike in the standard Prospect 
Theory, in Cumulative Prospect Theory decision makers do not choose stochastically dominated option. For surveys 
of the theoretical literature on optimal law enforcement, see Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000). 
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example, argue against draconian sanctions as they may discourage marginal deterrence, may lead 
to inefficient overinvestment in private law enforcement, and may lead to bankruptcy, which is 
harmful to the society. Furthermore, current antitrust policy relies heavily on the use of self-
reporting mechanisms (known as ‘leniency programs’) rather than industry audits for deterrence. 
But this had not been considered in the Beckerian model. Spagnolo (2004) shows that in contrast 
to Becker (1968) an optimally designed leniency program can achieve complete deterrence with a 
finite level of fine. The current study contributes to this debate by providing a clear result relating 
to the Beckerian Proposition question with a market experiment.5 The current study contributes 
also to the ongoing debate on optimal enforcement mechanisms, recently brought to the attention 
of the general public by The Economist (2012). 
We consider an experimental market with inelastic demand and constant marginal cost in 
which three firms compete in a repeated Bertrand game (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). Firms 
can form a non-binding price cartel. However, such collusion is illegal and, if detected, can result 
in antitrust penalties. We vary the probability of detection and the level of the antitrust fine in a 
controlled manner such that the expected fine remains the same. More specifically, our analysis 
compares two treatments: one with a high ρ and a low 𝔽 and a second with a low ρ and a high 𝔽 
that have the same expected cost of litigation 𝐸(𝐶) = ρ𝔽 . We additionally include two treatments, 
aiming to reflect leniency programs (Motta and Polo, 2003), in which we allow subjects to self-
report the existence of a cartel in return for a reduction in fines, but the expected cost to the non-
reporting firms still remains the same. 
The main finding of this study is that the Beckerian Proposition of the substitutability of 
fines and detection rates may be supported in an experimental framework. As predicted by the 
theory, different combinations of fine and detection rates with equal expected cost achieve the 
same deterrence effect. However, this is only true in an environment without leniency. With a 
leniency program, a high fine and low detection rate decrease the overall incidence of cartels, 
which is the ultimate aim of an anti-cartel mechanism. We explain this result with inconsistent 
beliefs about the detection probability when a leniency program is in effect. This paper, hence, 
provides supports from the point of view of behavioral economics (a la Chetty, 2015) for the policy 
move towards high fine when a leniency program is in effect. Finally, deviation from agreed 
                                                 
5 For the benefit of a behavioral economic analysis of law, see Jolls et al. (1998). Normann and Ricciuti (2009) and 
Hinloopen and Normann (2009) demonstrate how laboratory experiments can be used for economic policy making. 
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collusive price and reporting rates (under leniency) are independent of high or low fine 
combinations. The knowledge gained from this study is likely to guide both legal and economic 
discussions of rule enforcement, and can help to achieve a richer understanding of how economic 
agents may react to incentives under situations where violators are punished. 
Previous research in non-market context has shown that the Beckerian Proposition may 
(e.g., De Angelo and Charness, 2012; Hoerisch and Strassmair, 2012) or may not (e.g., Friedland 
et al., 1978; Anderson and Stafford, 2003) be supported. Thus results of these studies cannot easily 
be transferred to the domain of antitrust infringement. A market framework differs from the 
frameworks employed in previous studies in at least two dimensions. First, whereas violating the 
law is an individual decision in areas such as tax evasion, speeding or stealing, it requires a 
coordinated action in a cartel setting. Second, no definite conclusion can be drawn from other 
experimental environments, as policy tools such as leniency are unique to this market setting. As 
a result, without specific tests no definitive forecast can be made about the validity of the Beckerian 
Proposition in a market context.  
Table 1 places this study in the context of previous non-market experiments. The 
implications of the Beckerian Proposition to antitrust policy has widely been neglected in the 
experimental literature. To our knowledge, the only analysis is by Bigoni et al. (2015), who 
independently examine how leniency creates distrust among cartel members. They also vary 
detection rates and fines within a market frame – but use duopoly producers of differentiated goods 
and re-match the producers throughout the experiment. They find that absent leniency the 
probability of detection and expected fine are more effective to deter collusion, while with a 
leniency program fines deter collusion even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. 
Since duopoly is a very specific case in which collusion is easier, and since in real life firms do 
not get re-matched every period, the conclusions regarding the general applicability of the 
Beckerian Proposition in an oligopoly market are mixed at the best.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the 
experiment. Results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the chapter. 
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Table 1: Related experiments. 
 
Authors Frame Method Finding 
Friedland et al. (1978) Tax evasion Variation in either audit rate or fine with 
constant expected fine 
Larger fines are a stronger deterrent than 
frequent audits (although this is not 
statistically significant) 
Block and Gerety (1995) Sealed-bid auction Variation in either detection rate or fine, as 
well as offsetting change in both 
Risk loving (averse) subject are more (less) 
responsive to a change in detection rate 
than in fines 
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote 
(2004) 
Red-light running Variation in either detection rate or fine 
with constant expected fine 
Elasticity of violation with respect to 
increase in fines (detection) is between -.20 
and -.30 (-.15 and -.22) 
Anderson and Stafford 
(2003) 
Free-riding on 
Public Goods 
Variation in either detection rate or fine, 
both with increasing and constant expected 
fines 
Marginal effect of an increase in fines is 
one third larger than of an increase in 
detection 
De Angelo and Charness 
(2012) 
Speeding Uncertainty over the detection rate or fine. 
Subjects can vote for high (low) detection 
and low (high) fine regime 
Preference for high fine and low detection 
regimes. No significant differences in 
speeding rates 
Hoerisch and Strassmair 
(2012) 
Stealing Stealing & Variation in detection rate and 
fine, including treatments with same 
expected fine 
No difference in deterrence for equal 
expected fines. Only high expected fines 
deter 
Bigoni et al. (2015) Duopoly Cartel Variation in detection rate and fine, 
including treatments with leniency 
With leniency, fines deter even with zero 
detection probability 
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2. The Experiment 
2.1. Experimental procedure 
 The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in the Autumn of 2012. Subjects were 180 UEA 
students, without any prior experience in market experiments, recruited through the ‘Online 
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments’ or ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We employed a fixed 
matching in which every subject was matched with the same other two subjects for at least 20 
periods. This reflects the situation in real life where firms interact with each other in the same 
market repeatedly (and do not get rematched with other random firms in every period).  To avoid 
end-game effects we implemented a random stopping rule: at the beginning of period 21 and of 
each of the following periods, there was a 20% chance that the experiment stopped.6 
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, subjects faced a pen-and-paper risk 
elicitation task (Holt and Laury, 2002) where subjects chose between a set of increasingly risky 
options or a safe payout.7 A computerized dice-throw determined the outcome, but subjects did 
not receive feedback about this part of the experiment until the end of the session. After completing 
the risk elicitation task, subjects were provided with both computerized and printed instructions 
(see Appendix B) for the second part of the experiment which was computerized using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A questionnaire was used to ensure understanding. Finally, after the 
experiment finished, subjects were asked to fill out a demographic survey. 
For the first part, earnings were denoted in British pounds. For the second part, they were 
recorded in terms of ‘experimental points’, and converted to British pounds at a rate of 15p per 
point at the end of the experiment. The average payment was £11.41, including an initial 
endowment of £6 to cover potential losses. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid 
privately in cash. Sessions lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. 
 
                                                 
6 See Dal Bo (2005) for the importance of a random-stopping rule to reduce opportunistic behavior in strategic games. 
7 We allowed subjects to show inconsistent risk preferences, which we control in the regression analysis. As a measure 
of risk preferences, we count the number of risky choices made. The more often a subject chose the risky option over 
the safe alternative, the more risk-loving he/she is. 
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2.2. Experimental Design 
Our experimental design is a modified version of the cartel formation game in Gillet et al. 
(2011) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008). Subjects play the role of a firm with a common, 
constant marginal cost of 90. They face a repeated homogeneous-goods discrete Bertrand triopoly 
as in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000).8 In each period firms have to simultaneously decide if they 
want to form a non-binding cartel. If all three competitors in a given market decide to collude, they 
are informed that they mutually promised to charge the monoply price. Firms then simultaneously 
select a price 𝑝 from the discrete choice set {90,91, … ,102}, but are not obliged to set their agreed-
upon price. The firm charging the unique lowest price 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, earns the full market profit 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 −
90, while firms with a higher price receive no earnings. In case of ties, firms split the profit equally. 
In all but one treatment, reaching a price agreement comes at the risk of an antitrust fine, 
which is levied upon firms by a computerized Antitrust Authority. The novelty of our design comes 
from the controlled variation of the likelihood of detection and the magnitude of fines between the 
treatments. The detection probability can be either "low" (henceforth indicated by a small 𝑝) or 
"high" (hereafter indicated by a capital 𝑃). Likewise, fines can be either "low" (from now on 
indicated by a small 𝑓), or "high" (henceforth indicated by a capital 𝐹). Our design ensures that 
the expected cost (probability times fine level) is the same across the relevant treatments, i.e., 𝑝𝐹 =
𝑃𝑓.  This allows us to experimentally distinguish the deterrent effect of fines and detection 
probabilities given the same expected fine cost, while the comparison to the baseline treatment 
with no fines or audits can reveal that firms are indeed sensitive to fine and detection probabilities. 
We chose the detection probability based on the estimation of cartel detection rates by Bryant and 
Eckard (1991), who report rates between 13%-17%. Several previous market experiments used a 
rate of 15% (Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Gillet et al., 2012). We select 10% and 20% in order 
to ease the understanding for the subjects, while simultaneously selecting detection rates close to 
those observed in the real world. 
Two further treatments allow firms to self-report the existence of a cartel in return for a 
reduction in fines. This makes it possible to explore the robustness of the Beckerian Proposition 
                                                 
8 We specifically avoided a duopoly framework, since it is a very special case and it is known that the behavioural 
issues of reputation, spite, reciprocity etc. are prominent in such a case and will dilute the main research question.  
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in the presence of the leniency policy that is unique to a cartel setting. Examining the validity of 
the Beckerian Proposition with and without leniency also allows us to give policy advice to 
countries, such as Indonesia or the Philippines, that have not (yet) introduced a leniency policy. 
Similar to Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), reporting costs one experimental point. This is 
implemented in order to prevent firms to punish a deviating firm for free. If a firm is the sole self-
reporter, it gains complete immunity from fines whereas the other firms have to pay the full fine. 
If two (three) firms report, their fine is reduced by half (one-third). Fines in these treatments with 
leniency are denoted with l and L, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the treatments. 
Table 2: Experimental treatments 
Probability Fine Without leniency With leniency 
10% 8 
Low detection rate, high fine 
(Treatment 𝑝𝐹) 
Low detection rate, high fine 
(Treatment 𝑝𝐿) 
20% 4 
High detection rate, low fine 
(Treatment 𝑃𝑓) 
High detection rate, low fine 
(Treatment 𝑃𝑙) 
0% 0 Baseline 
 
Replicating real life, we assume that the liability for the illegal collusion lasts until the 
agreement has been detected or been revealed by means of a leniency application. This implies 
that a firm which stops colluding or deviates from its agreement can still be fined for its previous 
misconduct. At the beginning of each period of the experiment, firms are informed whether or not 
they are liable for a previous agreement. While firms can renew their agreement, they cannot end 
a potential previous liability. However, once fined, firms cannot be penalized again unless they 
decide to form a new cartel. 
The timing and information structure of the game is summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  
Timing and information structure 
 
 
1. Each firm expresses its willingness to reach an agreement over prices by selecting the 
appropriate button {yes, no}. If all firms in a given market wish to collude (click ‘yes’), they 
then enter a non-binding agreement to choose the joint profit maximizing price of 102. If at 
least one firm decides not to collude, then firms are informed about each rival’s choice and 
competition takes place in the market. 
2. Each firm chooses its price from the set {90, 91, …, 102}. Firms then observe all prices in 
their market, and learn whether their price is the lowest submitted price. 
3. In the treatments with leniency, each firm can decide to reveal the existence of a cartel at the 
expense of one experimental point. 
4. If no firm self-reports, the cartel may still be detected by the Antitrust Authority with the 
detection probability specified in the treatment. 
5. In the last step, firms are informed about their earnings in this period, whether collusion was 
detected or not, and about the number, but not identity, of the whistleblowers (reporters). 
At the end of the experiment, the number of experimental points earned in each period minus 
the penalties paid is converted into cash. The earnings from the risk elicitation task and the 
Bertrand game are then summed up and paid out in private. 
2.3. Theoretical Benchmark 
Across all treatments there exist multiple equilibria, but all firms setting a price of 91 is the 
payoff dominant equilibrium, which is also our benchmark. A price of 91 yields a competitive 
Leniency treatments only
Treatment 
Manipulation
Learning formation
Price
Decision
Collusion 
Decision
Reporting 
Decision
Final
Outcome
Learning prices 
Learning reporting 
and detection
Exogenous 
Enforcement
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profit of 𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 =
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝−𝑐
𝑛
=
91−90
3
=
1
3
. However, firms can coordinate on prices above the 
competitive equilibria by choosing to collude. The joint profit maximizing price is 102, which 
yields per period collusive profits of 𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙 =
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙−𝑐
𝑛
=
102−90
3
= 4. Engaging in price fixing comes 
at the risk of antitrust enforcement. Let ρ denote the probability that a fine is effectively imposed 
upon a colluding firm. Once a firm’s engagement in an illegal cartel has been detected, the 
exogenous Antitrust Authority levies a one-time fine 𝔽 = {
𝑓 = 4 𝑖𝑓ρ = 20%
𝐹 = 8 𝑖𝑓 ρ = 10%
 upon firms, where the 
"low" fine of 4 reflects a firm's one-shot profit from colluding, while a "high" fine of 8 equals 
twice the gain from colluding. It is important to note that the per-period expected fine ρ𝔽 = 0.8 is 
constant across treatments. Firms are liable for their infringement for an infinite time period, but 
can only be fined once (unless they re-form a cartel following detection). 
Denote 𝛿 as the rate of time preference. Then the net present value of the expected fine 
payments, given that if not punished the liability for fine rolls over to the future periods, is the 
expected fine in the first period of collusion. This equals the probability of detection (ρ) times the 
fine level (𝔽), plus the present value of the expected fine in the second period – which is the 
probability that the cartel was not detected in the first period (1 − ρ) times the probability of 
detection (ρ) times the fine level (𝔽) times the rate of time preference (𝛿), plus the present value 
of the expected fine in the third period, and so on. This equals ρ𝔽 + (1 − ρ)δρ𝔽 +
(1 − ρ)2δ2ρ𝔽+. . . =
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
. When collusion is enforced via grim-trigger strategies, a deviating 
firm slightly undercuts the collusive price, and gains a one shot deviation profit of 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 = 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑣 −
𝑐 = 101 − 90 = 11, followed by reversion to the competitive equilibria. The incentive 
compatibility constraint (ICC) for the Baseline is then: 
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙
1−𝛿
= 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 + 𝛿
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
1−𝛿
,   
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
= 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑣 − 𝑐 + 𝛿
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
,  
4
1−𝛿
= 11 + 𝛿
1
3
1−𝛿
.  (1) 
where the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (1) consists of the net collusive profit of continuous 
cartel infringement. The right-hand side (RHS) is the one-shot profit from deviation plus the 
expected earnings from reverting to competition.  
Similarly, the ICC for a treatment absent leniency but with antitrust enforcement is given by: 
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𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 −
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
+ 𝛿
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
1−𝛿
,  
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑣 − 𝑐 −
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
+
𝛿
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
,  
4
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 11 −
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
+ 𝛿
1
3
1−𝛿
.  (2) 
where the LHS of equation (2) consists of the infinite gain from collusion minus the expected fine 
payment, and the RHS is the one-shot profit from deviation plus the expected earnings from 
competition, minus the expected fine payment. Note that the critical threshold for the discount 
factor in (1) and (2) is identical. As in the framework of Becker (1968), the theoretical prediction 
would therefore not report any significant differences between the treatments 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑃𝑓. 
Furthermore, note that in the presence of leniency, the optimal deviation strategy is to report at the 
expense of 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1. The ICC for a treatment with leniency is then: 
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑣 − 1 + 𝛿
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
1−𝛿
,  
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑣 − 𝑐 − 1 + 𝛿
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝−𝑐
𝑛
1−𝛿
, 
  
4
1−𝛿
−
ρ𝔽
1−𝛿(1−ρ)
= 10 + 𝛿
1
3
1−𝛿
.  (3) 
 
The LHS consists of the net gain from collusion, while the RHS consists of the one-shot profit 
of deviation and reversion to competition, minus the cost of a leniency application but no expected 
fine payment exists due to the leniency towards the self-reporting firm. 
2.4. Hypotheses 
Insights from the law and economics literature, existing experimental findings and the 
theoretical benchmark offer predictions that we can examine within our experiment. The analysis 
will focus mainly on three statistics. First, we seek to investigate cartel formation, which can be 
measured by observing the actual incidence of collusive markets. The Beckerian Proposition 
implies that the severity and probability of punishment are substitutable (Becker, 1968). In our 
experimental setting this means that firms respond in the same way to an increase in the likelihood 
of an enforcement action as to an increase in the severity of antitrust fines when the expected fine 
is the same. The alternative hypothesis is that higher fines have a larger deterrence effect 
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(Anderson and Stafford, 2003), both with and without a leniency policy in place. Regarding cartels, 
the hypotheses (irrespective of leniency) are thus the following:  
 Hypothesis 1: When 
𝜕𝐸(𝐶)
𝜕𝜌⁄ =
𝜕𝐸(𝐶)
𝜕𝔽⁄ , firm response in cartel formation is 
expected to be the same for a marginal increase in 𝜌 and a marginal increase in 𝔽.   
 Alternative Hypothesis 1: When
𝜕𝐸(𝐶)
𝜕𝜌⁄ =
𝜕𝐸(𝐶)
𝜕𝔽⁄ , firms are expected to be less 
likely to form a cartel for a marginal increase in 𝔽 than for a marginal increase in 𝜌.   
When we consider leniency, however, it may be possible that the subject’s belief about the 
detection probability is different from the stated exogenous one in the experiment. Since leniency 
involves a risk that a partner in crime might report the crime, the belief about the detection 
probability is higher. That is, subjects may make mistakes when forming subjective probabilities 
about detection, as indicated in the behavioral economics literature. In such a case the results with 
and without leniency might be different. We return to this issue later. 
Second, we consider the impact on prices. An Asking price is the price a firm charges, 
whereas the Market price is the minimum price charged in a market. In the theoretical benchmark, 
the parameters of the enforcement regime do not influence the profit-maximizing price. Our null 
hypothesis is therefore that neither of the prices differ between the treatments. Stigler (1970) 
argues that tougher punishment may lead to a more severe crime. In a market framework, a more 
severe punishment may cause firms to charge higher prices (Jensen et al., 2013). Our alternative 
hypothesis is therefore that prices are higher when fines are large. Regarding pricing the 
hypotheses are thus: 
 Hypothesis 2: When 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑃𝑓 then the asking price as well as the market price do not vary 
across probability-fine combinations (i.e., price𝑃𝑓 = price𝑝𝐹 and price𝑃𝑙 = price𝑝𝐿). 
 Alternative Hypothesis 2: When 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑃𝑓 then the asking price as well as the market 
price are higher in 𝐹 (𝐿) compared to 𝑓 (𝑙) (i.e., price𝑝𝐹 > price𝑃𝑓 and price𝑝𝐿 > price𝑃𝑙).   
Finally, we investigate cartel stability by observing how often firms within a cartel deviate 
from the joint profit-maximization price, and how often they self-report in the case of leniency. As 
incentive constraints in our setting are satisfied for all treatments, a colluding firm should stick to 
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a collusive agreement and should not apply unilaterally for leniency, independent of the detection 
rate and the fine level. Our null hypotheses therefore states that there will be no difference in cartel 
stability (in terms of deviation or in terms of reporting) between the treatments. We test this against 
the alternative hypothesis that there will be more self-reporting and deviations in 𝑝𝐿 than in 𝑃𝑙. 
We expect this, because due to behavioral bias, deviating firms will try to avoid high fines by self-
reporting. In summary, we state the following null hypotheses which we test against the alternative 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3A: When 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑃𝑙 then the number of deviations from the agreed price are 
the same across probability-fine combinations (i.e., number of deviations𝑝𝐿 =
number of deviations𝑃𝑙). 
Alternative Hypothesis 3A: When 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑃𝑙 then there will be more deviations in 𝑝𝐿 than 
in 𝑃𝑙 (i.e., number of deviations𝑝𝐿 > number of deviations𝑃𝑙). 
Hypothesis 3B: When 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑃𝑙 then the number of self-reports are the same across 
probability-fine combinations (i.e., number of reports𝑝𝐿 = number of reports𝑃𝑙). 
Alternative Hypothesis 3B: When 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑃𝑙 then there will be more self-reporting in 𝑝𝐿 
than in 𝑃𝑙 (i.e., number of reports𝑝𝐿 > number of reports𝑃𝑙). 
3. Results 
The results are presented in three parts. First, we test whether combinations of detection rate and 
level of fines resulting in equal expected fines are equally successful in deterring collusion, or 
whether any particular policy regime is more successful in reducing the actual incidence of cartels 
(Hypothesis 1). Next, we compare the prices (and hence consumer welfare) under each antitrust 
regime. We ask if higher fines and lower detection probabilities diminish collusive price 
(Hypothesis 2). Finally, we focus on successfully formed cartels and investigate defection and self-
reporting (Hypotheses 3A and 3B). 
Throughout the paper all tests are performed with the entire sample, but restricting the 
analysis to observations from round 1 to 20 produces a consistent sample that we report when 
relevant.  Since the observations are inter-dependent within a market, the average statistic of all 
three firms combined constitutes one unit of observation. Thirty-six subjects participated in each 
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treatment and we have 59 independent observations.9 We further carry out a panel data analysis 
reported in the relevant subsections. 
3.1. Cartel Activity 
Our key indicator to test the Beckerian Proposition is the rate of cartelized markets – the percentage 
of markets in which a cartel exists, taking into account that undetected cartels carry over into later 
periods. We define a market to be cartelized if a cartel agreement was in place at the price decision 
stage. Figure 2 shows the average fraction of cartelized markets aggregated over all periods, and 
highlights the relative effectiveness of each treatment in reducing the occurrence of cartels as 
compared to a laissez-faire baseline.  
Figure 2. Average fraction of cartelized markets. 
 
As can be observed, antitrust regimes differ greatly in the resulting number of cartelized 
markets. With antitrust enforcement, between 9% and 45% of all markets are cartelized, while in 
a laissez-faire environment 90% markets are cartelized. At a first glance, the rate varies along two 
dimensions. There seem to be a difference between low fine - high detection and high fine - low 
detection regimes, and there seems to be fewer cartels with than without leniency. We check both 
the phenomenon one by one. 
                                                 
9 One observation had to be dropped, as two subjects accumulated fines that were greater than their profit plus initial 
endowment. Treatment 𝑝𝐿 hence has 11 independent observations. 
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While our results indicate fewer cartels for high detection rates - low fines absent leniency, 
the opposite pattern emerges with leniency. The difference in the percentage of cartelized markets 
across all treatments (except baseline) is statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.04). We 
compare 𝑝𝐹 vs. 𝑃𝑓 and 𝑝𝐿 vs. 𝑃𝑙 in order to test for the substitutability of detection rate and 
sanctions with and without leniency. We find support for Becker (1968), as we cannot reject our 
null hypothesis of equal population means for low detection rates and high fines without leniency 
(Mann-Whitney test, p=0.56). However, a higher fine and lower detection regime reduces the 
number of cartelized markets in the presence of leniency (one-sided t-test, p=0.04) questioning the 
general validity of the Beckerian Proposition. An analysis of the evolution of cartelized markets 
over time reveals that the least number of cartels were operating in the 𝑝𝐿 treatment, followed by 
𝑃𝑙 and then the two treatments without leniency.  
An alternative indicator of cartel activity commonly used in the literature (Hinloopen and 
Soetevent, 2008; Gillet et al., 2011; Bigoni et al., 2012) is the propensity to collude, i.e., the 
percentage of firms in favor of cartel formation. Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for this 
alternative statistic. 
Table 3: Propensity to collude – Average (Std. Dev.) per treatment. 
Probability Fine Without leniency With leniency 
10% 8 50.74 (19.04) 53.84 (10.42) 
20% 4 49.74 (16.97) 64.67 (12.33) 
Baseline 76.69 (12.33) 
Note: The propensity to collude is calculated using the binary decision of a firm to attempt a collusion.  
Not surprisingly, we note that in comparison with the baseline treatment, all antitrust 
sanctions effectively deter collusion attempts. Of greater interest, however, is that the difference 
in the propensity to collude across treatments in which an enforcement regime is in place is 
statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p<0.01).10 
                                                 
10 We also investigated the attempt to collude at the very first period of the experiment, which can be seen as a measure 
of pre-deterrence. There is no significant difference between the enforcement regimes. 
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In order to understand what drives the differences, we focus on the leniency policy. A 
comparison reveals that the propensity to collude is about 9% higher in the presence of a leniency 
program, and this is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.04). This hints at the possible 
pro-collusive effect of leniency, described in Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2000), 
according to which firms use self-reporting as a punishment against defectors. Next, we turn to a 
comparison of 𝑝𝐹 vs. 𝑝𝐿 and 𝑃𝑓 vs. 𝑃𝑙, in order to test if the pro-collusive effect exists for both 
detection-fine ratios. A bivariate test yields no significant differences between the two treatments 
with a low detection rate and high fines, but collusion attempts are significantly more frequent in 
the 𝑃𝑙 than in the 𝑃𝑓 treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.03). 
Our subsequent focus is on the second potential driver, i.e., the difference between the 
detection rates and fines. We pool 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑝𝐿 and compare them with pooled 𝑃𝑓 and 𝑃𝑙 and cannot 
find any statistically significant difference (Mann-Whitney test, p>0.1). However, as we showed 
that treatments with and without leniency differ in their respective deterrence, we need to assess 
the substitutability of fine and detection rates for each policy regime separately. Table 4 documents 
the p-values of pairwise two-sided Mann-Whitney comparisons.  
Table 4: Propensity to collude – p-values of pairwise two-sided MWU-tests. 
  pF Pf pL Pl 
Baseline 0.0039*** 0.0016*** 0.0081*** 0.0325** 
pF  1.0000 0.6225 0.0646* 
Pf   0.7583 0.0282** 
pL    0.0488** 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
The table can be read in the following way. First, there is no significant difference between 
the treatments without leniency (note that p = 1 are approximations). This is particularly 
interesting, as it supports the substitutability of fine and detection rates to achieve the same 
deterrence. However, the table also reveals that the difference in the propensity to collude between 
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𝑝𝐿 and 𝑃𝑙 is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.05). This finding questions the 
robustness of the Beckerian Proposition when a leniency policy is in place. 
Figure 3: Evolution of the fraction of firms who wish to form a cartel (Left) and histogram 
of the number of firms willing to form a cartel (Right). 
 
To attain a more concrete understanding of a firm's decision to favor collusion, we now 
consider the evolution of the propensity to collude over time. We use the restricted sample of 20 
rounds to display dynamics over time in order to avoid possible distortions caused by the 
unbalanced number of observations in later rounds. The dynamics of the fraction of firms that 
favor collusion are tracked on the left hand side of Figure 3, in which we have divided the time 
dimension into four periods. The right hand side of Figure 3 depicts a histogram of the number of 
firms in a market that were willing to collude. For the former, note that collusion rates tend to 
decline mildly over time, with the exception of Pl which slightly converges towards the Baseline. 
For the latter, note that cartel formation is a unanimous decision: a cartel is only formed if all three 
firms express their willingness to collude. We observe that treatments with leniency have the 
highest number of "all-but-one" cases, which is in line with the findings by Hinloopen and 
Soetevent (2008). Most importantly, the right hand side of the histogram depicts the rate at which 
cartels are being formed (i.e., all three firms agreed to collude, regardless of the existence of a 
cartel in previous periods). A pairwise comparison of the rate at which cartels are being formed 
reveals no statistically significant difference between 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑃𝑓, but the observed higher rate in 
𝑃𝑙 than in 𝑝𝐿 is statistically significant (one-sided t-test, p=0.05). Note that the lowest rate of cartel 
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formation is in the 𝑝𝐿 treatment, indicating that in the presence of leniency, high fines and low 
detection rates seem most effective in deterring cartels.  
The analysis so far, however, is not complete as we aggregated the individual decisions in 
each market and hence did not fully explain the causes of this result at the firm-level. In the next 
step of our analysis, we therefore conduct a regression analysis in which we treat each firm as a 
unit of observation in order to better understand the behavioral forces that drive our initial findings. 
The model explains a firm’s individual decision to engage in a cartel by means of a dynamic 
random-intercepts logit model where the dependent variable is the binary choice to attempt 
collusion. To account for potential random disturbances caused by the group composition, we 
employ random-effect at the level of markets. In addition to the treatment dummies, we include a 
period and a period-squared variable to correct for a potential trend over time. Independent 
variables further include the lagged decision to collude in the previous period (Decision to 
collude_t-1), a dummy indicating whether or not a cartel has been successfully formed in the 
previous period (Cartel formed_t-1) and a dummy indicating whether a cartel has been detected 
(Cartel detected_t-1) or reported (Cartel reported_t-1) in the previous period. Further, we use a 
dummy which takes the value 1 if a cartel existed in the previous period and at least one member 
deviated by charging a price below the collusive one. In a further set of estimations, we add 
additional variables. In model 2, we control for individual risk preferences by including the number 
of risky choices that were made during the risk elicitation task, as well as a dummy variable 
(inconsistent preferences) to control for subjects that expressed inconsistent risk attitudes by 
switching more than once between the safe and the risky lottery options.11 Finally, in model 3 we 
use the number of times a firm has so far been involved in a cartel, as well as the number of times 
its engagement in a cartel was detected or reported, as alternative explanatory variables. Table 5 
displays the results of the regressions. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender and nationality does not affect the sign or 
significance of the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 5: Decision to collude – Random effects logistic regression 
Decision to collude Without leniency (Base: pF) With leniency (Base: pL) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Pf 0.0411 0.165 0.236    
 (0.250) (0.271) (0.231)    
Pl    0.381** 0.376** 0.314** 
    (0.170) (0.169) (0.146) 
Decision to collude (t-1) 2.933*** 2.766*** 2.582*** 3.571*** 3.563*** 3.179*** 
 (0.139) (0.142) (0.132) (0.163) (0.163) (0.142) 
Period -0.00630 -0.00995 0.0321 -0.0166 -0.0182 0.0129 
 (0.0390) (0.0394) (0.0412) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0449) 
Period2 -0.000646 -0.000591 -0.00115 -0.000307 -0.000249 -0.000566 
 (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00164) (0.00165) (0.00161) 
Cartel formed (t-1) -0.764*** -0.640***  0.648 0.859  
 (0.220) (0.233)  (0.580) (0.595)  
Cartel detected (t-1) -0.625** 0.617**  -0.298 -0.425  
 (0.288) (0.303)  (0.480) (0.487)  
Cartel reported (t-1)    -2.278*** -1.674**  
    (0.583) (0.686)  
Price defection (t-1) -0.0355 -0.087  -0.908 -0.891  
 (0.174) (0.181)  (0.583) (0.586)  
Risk choice  0.159*** 0.168***  0.0321 0.0248 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.029) (0.027) 
Inconsistent preference  -0.251 -0.284  -0.209 -0.094 
  (0.241) (0.242)  (0.205) (0.185) 
# times busted   -0.257   0.409*** 
   (0.163)   (0.151) 
# times colluded   -0.0216   0.320** 
   (0.0228)   (0.129) 
Constant -1.216*** -1.898*** -2.153*** -1.309*** -1.386*** -1.609*** 
 (0.302) (0.335) (0.334) (0.288) (0.309) (0.299) 
Observations 1710 1710 1710 1524 1524 1524 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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For the regressions in the three columns on the left-hand side, the 𝑝𝐹 treatment is used as 
a benchmark, represented by the constant term. On the right-hand side, we use the 𝑝𝐿 treatment as 
our benchmark in order to investigate the effect of a different detection-fine regime given the 
presence of a leniency program. The regressions confirm the earlier results from the non-
parametric analysis. The coefficient of the treatment dummy 𝑃𝑓 is not statistically significant, 
indicating no difference in deterrence, while the estimated coefficient 𝑃𝑙 is of positive sign and 
significant at the 5% level.  
With respect to the other variables, we make the following observations. First, there is 
strong evidence of behavioral momentum, i.e., the previous period’s decision to collude, 
represented by the Decision to collude_t-1 dummy, positively affects the decision in the current 
period. Second, we do not obtain a statistically significant effect of time between the treatments, 
and whether or not a price deviation occurred in the previous period also seems irrelevant. Third, 
as undetected cartels carry over into the next periods, without leniency forming a cartel in the 
previous period negatively affects the odds to decide to collude. Interestingly, experiencing an 
antitrust action has a deterrence effect by reducing the odds to collude. However, Cartel formed_t-
1 and Cartel detected_t-1 are not significant in the regressions with leniency. This is because these 
effects are incorporated in the likelihood of being reported by a partner in crime. The size and sign 
of the coefficient Cartel reported_t-1 indicate that experiencing self-reporting is one of the main 
factors that deters a firm's decision to collude again. Fourth, the inconsistent risk preferences 
variable is not significant. It is probably because subjects with inconsistent preferences would have 
varying behavior and therefore insignificant coefficients.  Finally, while controlling for risk 
preferences does not change the sign or statistical significance of the coefficients, risk choice turns 
out significant in the comparison of the treatments without leniency, but not in the comparison 
with leniency. This, again, is because due to leniency the risk of getting caught is higher and this 
is incorporated in the Cartel reported_t-1 variable. 
Combining the non-parametric test results as well as the results from the regressions, we 
can now present our first main result:  
Result 1: Cartelized Markets  
Absent leniency, the fine and detection rate are substitutes with respect to the occurrence of cartels 
– supporting the Beckerian proposition. However, when leniency exists, a lower detection 
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probability and higher fine regime is significantly stronger in reducing the number of active cartels 
than a higher detection and lower fine regime. 
The result partially (in absence of leniency) supports the Beckerian proposition. But it does 
not directly shed light on why the anomaly is observed when leniency is in practice. The regression 
offers a possible behavioral explanation for this finding. It is possible that the perceived probability 
of detection is distorted under leniency. As a result of such probability distortion (in the line of 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) subjects perceive the detection rate under leniency much higher 
and give high weight to the lag report variable. This implies a perceived high expected cost under 
the high fine regime, resulting in reduction in cartel formation. 
3.2. Market Prices 
Although understanding the determinants of collusion is useful, a more important analysis relates 
to the market price. A change in the level of fines and detection rates might also affect the price 
that colluding firms charge. An antitrust authority that cares about consumer welfare will try to 
achieve lower prices while changing the enforcement regime, or at least it will try to prevent an 
increase in prices. How an incorrectly designed enforcement regime can provide incentives to 
commit a more severe crime was first discussed by Stigler (1970) and has recently been explored 
by Jensen et al. (2013) for collusion. Their models predict that firms might react to higher fines by 
increasing their prices. Here we investigate the effects of antitrust policy on prices.12 
Table 6 shows the market prices for all treatments, differentiated between the price charged 
in rounds with and without a cartel. We make the following two observations. First, market prices 
in the collusive markets are about 3.5% above the prices in the competitive markets. This supports 
the gain from collusion that we identified previously. Second, different enforcement regimes have 
essentially no effect on market prices in competitive markets. Prices absent collusion are close to 
the theoretical Bertrand equilibrium. Furthermore, the prices in collusive markets are about 7.2% 
below the joint profit maximizing price which indicates the existence of price deviations. 
  
                                                 
12 Another useful way is to investigate this issue is to analyse the effects on asking prices (average of the three stated 
price). We discuss this in Appendix A. The results are not very different. 
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Table 6: Market prices – Average (Std. Dev.) per treatment. 
  Collusive Competitive 
Probability Fine Without 
leniency 
With 
leniency 
Without 
leniency 
With 
leniency 
10% 8 93.82 (3.25) 94.61 (3.11) 91.56 (0.90) 91.33 (1.20) 
20% 4 93.04 (1.99) 95.47 (4.37) 91.20 (0.32) 91.29 (0.68) 
Baseline 94.32 (2.68) 93.62 (1.25) 
Note: Market prices are calculated as the minimum of the three stated prices in a market. 
In a further Kruskal-Wallis test we find that prices in cartel groups may appear more 
dispersed than in competitive markets, but there is no statistically significant difference between 
them with or without leniency (p>0.1).13 A pairwise comparison using Mann-Whitney tests in a 
similar manner as in our previous analysis confirms this. In other words, we observe no statistically 
significant evidence that suggests any validation of the claim that policy regimes will influence 
the severity of the committed crime. These regularities become easily recognizable in Figure 4, 
which reports the evolution of market prices over time, both for the collusive and the competitive 
markets. 
Figure 4. Market prices for collusive (Left) and competitive (Right) markets. 
 
                                                 
13 This holds also for a comparison of market prices without distinguishing between collusive and competitive markets. 
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The observed patterns over time do not allow us to reject Hypothesis 2. We can thus present 
our second result:  
Result 2: Prices  
With a constant expected fine, irrespective of the presence of a leniency program, the market prices 
remain the same across treatments.  
To assess which policy regime is to be favored from a consumer's point of view, we further 
investigate the average consumer welfare, which is defined as the difference between the 
maximum willingness to pay of 102 and the actual market price. It is not immediately clear whether 
or not a leniency program is welfare improving (Kruskal-Wallis test, p>0.1). In pairwise 
comparison of 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑃𝑓 to 𝑝𝐿 and 𝑃𝑙, we find no significant difference. Hence, ceteris paribus, 
if a higher level of investigation requires a higher level of logistic expenditures, then given the 
same consumer surplus, a high fine regime may be preferred.  
3.3. Cartel Stability  
In the final part of the analysis we focus on successfully formed cartels in order to understand 
cartel stability. Specifically, we investigate defection and self-reporting, which can be understood 
as a proxy for the internal (in)stability of a cartel. We measure defection by the percentage of firms 
within a cartel that select a price below 102 and hence deviate from the agreement. Table 7 
provides the average defection rates for each treatment. 
Table 7: Rate of price defection (in %) – Average (Std. Dev.) per treatment. 
Probability Fine Without leniency With leniency 
10% 8 69.84 (27.70) 57.14 (18.35) 
20% 4 74.54 (20.92) 53.78 (31.05) 
Baseline 66.97 (23.83) 
Note: The average rate of price defection (conditional upon the existence of a cartel) is the percent of firms 
that deviated from the agreed cartel price. It is calculated using a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a cartel 
member stated a price less than 102, and 0 otherwise. 
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Note that defection rates vary significantly across treatments at the 10 percent significance 
level (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.09). Firms undercut the agreed upon price more rigorously in the 
absence of leniency. In fact, the rate of price deviations is about 17% lower for the two leniency 
treatments, and this difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.02). This 
finding is not surprising, as it has been often argued that firms utilize the leniency program to 
punish deviators. E.g. Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) report that the agreed-upon price is 
undercut in 97% of the cases with leniency as compared to 75% without leniency. 
Of greater interest is the difference between 𝒑𝑭 and 𝑷𝒇, and between 𝒑𝑳 and 𝑷𝒍, which 
are both statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney test, p >0.1). However, it is important to note 
that only about 9% of all markets in the 𝒑𝑳 treatment had a cartel. The number of observations 
that we can use for statistical tests is hence limited, so that we may lack the power necessary to 
find significant differences. 
Table 8: Rate of reporting in leniency (in %) – Average (Std. Dev.) per treatment. 
Probability Fine Reporting Given own 
deviation 
Given other firm 
deviation 
10% 8 54.34 (11.55) 34.12 (09.31) 53.17 (11.50) 
20% 4 56.52 (30.10) 37.71 (26.66) 54.35 (32.26) 
Note: The average rate of reporting (calculated only for the Leniency treatments) is the percent of firms, as 
cartel members, that report a cartel. It is calculated using a dummy that takes value 1 if a cartel member 
self-reports, and 0 otherwise. 
We now focus on the use of the leniency program by self-reporting, i.e., when a firm reveals 
the existence of a cartel to avoid the possibility of an antitrust fine. Recall, however, that self-
reporting does not guarantee full immunity from fines. Similar to the design of leniency programs 
in the experimental literature, a reporting firm may still pay a (reduced) fine if more than one firm 
reports the cartel. Table 8 contains the average reporting rates for each treatment.14 The rate of 
                                                 
14 An alternative way to analyze the effect of leniency is to observe the fraction of established cartels that collapse due 
to reporting. In the 𝑝𝐿 treatment, 95.23% of the established cartels had at least one whistleblower, compared to 82.88% 
in 𝑃𝑙. While on a first view these rates appear extremely high, they are not too different from the 78% reported in 
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008). 
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self-reporting using all observations is reported on the left side, while the right side of Table 8 
provides with the rate of self-reporting using only observations where a firm either deviated itself, 
or experienced a deviation from another cartel member. 
We observe no statistically significant difference between the two treatments with leniency 
(Mann-Whitney test, p>0.1). While this does not allow us to reject the our null hypothesis 3B in 
support of the alternative hypotheses, we need to be aware that very few markets in 𝒑𝑳 are 
cartelized and that this limits the number of observations from which we can draw conclusions. 
To investigate if firms use the leniency program as part of a deviation strategy, we test for 
the percentage of cartel members that self-report after they have deviated from the collusive price. 
This strategy is used by 34.12% and 37.71% of firms in 𝒑𝑳 and 𝑷𝒍 . Next, we check if firms self-
report to punish deviators. Indeed 53.17% (54.35%) of firms in 𝒑𝑳 (𝑷𝒍) report after deviations by 
others (conditional on sticking to the collusive agreement themselves). This pattern indicates that 
firms use leniency more often to punish deviators, than as part of their own deviation strategy. 
However, as the differences are not statistically significant, we conclude:  
Result 3: Stability  
Firms deviate less often in the presence of leniency, and report more often if fines are low and 
detection is more likely. However, the deviation rate as well as the reporting rate do not vary 
significantly between different detection-fine combinations. 
4. Conclusion 
 We experimentally examine the Beckerian Proposition, according to which different 
combinations of the magnitude and the likelihood of punishment achieve the same deterrence 
effect, in a market setting. This key principle in the law and economics literature has been 
supported in previous laboratory experiments on speeding and stealing but not in other 
experimental settings such as free-riding and tax evasion. The ambiguous evidence makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions for the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms by antitrust 
authorities who face a trade-off between economizing on costly enforcement actions and the 
potential adverse effects of a higher fine rate. Criminal activities in a market framework differ 
from all previously studied situations, as the violation of antitrust laws is a coordinated rather than 
an individual action. Moreover, antitrust agencies utilize policy tools such as leniency to weaken 
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incentives and punish wrongdoers. It is therefore unclear how firms will react if authorities vary 
either the likelihood of detection or the level of fines but keep the expected fine constant. The 
current study closes this gap by experimentally varying the probability of detection and the amount 
of antitrust fines in a repeated Bertrand game with inelastic demand and exogenous antitrust 
enforcement. 
In summary, we find support for the Beckerian Proposition, but only when there is no 
leniency policy in place. With a lenience policy, fines and the probability of detection are not 
perfect substitutes.  In specific, we find that without leniency, fines and detection rates are 
substitutes. It is reassuring that, as predicted by theory, different combinations of the magnitude 
and the likelihood of punishment seem to be interchangeable instruments to deter cartels. However, 
when a leniency policy exists, a lower detection rate with higher fines significantly reduces the 
rate at which firms attempt to form a cartel. More importantly, a high fine and low detection policy 
under leniency decreases the overall incidence of cartels, which is the ultimate aim of a deterrence 
mechanism. We find the effects of different detection-fine combinations on market prices and 
observe that no fine-detection regime is significantly superior in terms of its destabilization of 
cartels. These results are consistent with the presence of behavioral bias among test subjects.  If 
this bias is present among real cartel participants, then high fines would be more effective at 
reducing cartel activity than high rates of detection, ceteris paribus.    
 From a policy point of view, the results have important implications. The results indicate 
that society cannot just economize on costs of enforcement, as postulated by Becker (1968), when 
a leniency policy is in place or under consideration as a policy tool. The results give empirical 
support for the policy move towards higher fines as orchestrated recently by the erstwhile Office 
of Fair Trading in the UK or the ones debated in Germany and the US. 
An important caveat needs to be stated as we discuss the policy implications. In our 
experiment students played the roles of the firms. Hence, if there are differences in behavior 
between firm managers and students, the final results may be affected. For example, unlike student 
behavior, firm behavior might be unaffected by the leniency policy. Hence, although the literature 
shows that professional and student behavior do not diverge significantly (Frechette, 2015) and 
that experimental results can indeed be applied for competition policy (Hinloopen and Normann, 
2009), one needs to be careful about the implementation of our results in the field.  
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The results raise two immediate questions: First, why does the Beckerian Proposition hold 
absent leniency, but not when a leniency policy exists? And second, if the detection rate and fine 
are not substitutable, why do we observe stronger deterrence in 𝑝𝐿 than in 𝑃𝑙? 
A simple behavioral theory of probability distortion (a la Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
can answer both the questions. Firms may assume a different perceived likelihood of detection 
when a leniency program exists. Absent leniency, the perceived detection probability is the 
exogenously given probability – and hence no significant difference between 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑃𝑓 exists. 
However, the perceived detection probability with leniency is a combination of the exogenous 
detection rate and the belief that other firms may self-report (say, 𝜏). The aggregated perceived 
probability is then (𝜏 + 𝑝) in 𝑝𝐿 and (𝜏 + 𝑃) in 𝑃𝑙. It is easy to observe that the perceived expected 
cost in such a case is higher in 𝑝𝐿 than in 𝑃𝑙. Hence, the Beckerian Proposition may break down 
under leniency, especially if the belief that other firms may self-report is very high. It is, however, 
also possible to explain our results even when 𝜏 is not too high. The perceived likelihood that 
another firm self-reports may also depend on the fine levels, as a higher (lower) fine provides more 
(less) incentives to self-report following a non-linear probability weighting (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992; Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2013). If for 𝑝𝐿 the perceived likelihood of detection is 
greater than for 𝑃𝑙, this results in higher expected cost in the 𝑝𝐿 treatment. A support for this 
explanation comes from the regression results in Table 5 that shows significance for the lag report 
variable and lack of significance for risk preference under leniency. 
There are various interesting directions to extend the current study. Issues such as 
wastefully spending resources on avoidance activities (Chowdhury and Wandschneider, 2014), 
whether the Beckerian Proposition holds when the fine level is endogenous to cartel damage, and 
which of the fine or detection tools have bigger effects on post-cartel tacit collusion (Chowdhury 
and Crede, 2015) have not yet been investigated. We leave these for future research. 
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Appendix A - Additional Results on Asking Price 
 
One may argue that the experimental design allows firms to tacitly collude to avoid detection, 
which would make it impossible to discuss consumer welfare. If firms were indeed tacitly 
colluding, one would expect no significant difference between asking prices within and outside of 
a cartel. We address this by investigating the asking price, the average of the three stated prices in 
a given market in a particular period. Table 9 yields the asking prices for all treatments, and 
distinguishes between the price charged in rounds with and without a cartel.15 At a first glance, 
three main insights emerge from that table: (i) prices do not appear different when varying 
detection probability and magnitude of fines, (ii) but they appear higher in collusive than in 
competitive markets; and (iii) it is not obvious if prices are substantially different given the 
presence or absence of a leniency policy. 
Table 9: Asking prices – Average (Std. Dev.) per treatment. 
  Collusive Competitive 
Probability Fine Without 
leniency 
With 
leniency 
Without 
leniency 
With 
leniency 
10% 8 95.75 (2.90) 97.89 (2.10) 93.81 (1.92) 92.56 (1.59) 
20% 4 95.66 (2.11) 98.06 (2.90) 92.36 (0.86) 93.01 (1.08) 
Baseline 96.23 (2.69) 95.96 (2.44) 
Note: Asking prices are calculated as the average of the three stated prices in a market. 
It is important to notice that there exists a clear gain from colluding, as asking prices are 
between 3 and 4 points higher in collusive than in competitive markets. These findings appear all 
the more remarkable as the gain from colluding exists even though the cartel agreement was not 
                                                 
15 Arguably, subjects will self-select into collusive and competitive markets. A pairwise comparison of asking prices 
without distinguishing between collusive and competitive markets reveals no statistically significant difference 
between prices with leniency. Absent leniency, prices are higher if fines are high and detection rates are low. 
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binding, and no actual communication by means of, for example, a chat took place. Further, we 
observe that asking prices from competitive markets are not statistically different across treatments 
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p>0.1). This is intuitive, as absent collusion firms face identical decisions 
across our treatments. There is however mild statistical evidence that asking prices are different 
for collusive markets (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.09). This in fact supports the findings of Bigoni et 
al. (2012), who report statistically higher prices inside, but not outside of cartels. The difference 
can be observed when we compare the price dynamics over time. Figure 5 depicts the per-period 
average asking prices for collusive and competitive markets. The figure reveals a tendency for 
more dispersed prices in collusive markets, while prices in competitive markets move almost 
parallel with little differences over time. 
Figure 5: Asking prices for collusive (Left) and competitive (Right) markets. 
 
Turning to statistical tests, for which we focus only on collusive markets, we compare the 
asking price with and without leniency. We find that asking prices are about 2 points higher in the 
presence of leniency, and this difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.01). 
Higher cartel prices in treatments with leniency are also reported in Bigoni et al. (2012), who 
emphasize that in the presence of a leniency program firms undercut the agreed-upon price and 
self-report. Hence, punitive price-war will occur in competitive markets, while absent leniency the 
price war might take place within the cartel. A similar reasoning can be applied to our experimental 
design, which may artificially inflate prices in treatments with leniency. 
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In the next step, we check if this effect of leniency also exists independent of the fine-
detection ratio. We find no statistically significant difference between the asking prices 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑝𝐿, 
but for high detection rates and low fine there is mild evidence of a statistical difference between 
𝑃𝑓 and 𝑃𝑙 (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.08). A more detailed comparison shows that the difference 
between low detection rates and high detection rates is neither statistically significant for 𝑝𝐿 vs. 
𝑃𝑙, nor for a comparison between 𝑝𝐹 and 𝑃𝑓. In other words, our analysis provides no statistical 
support for the suggestion that firms react to higher fines by raising their asking prices. We, hence, 
conclude that fine and detection ratios are indeed substitutable with respect to their effect on asking 
prices.  
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Appendix B - Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. 
How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on the decision made by other 
participants in this room. 
The experiment will proceed in two parts. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is Pound 
Sterling (GBP). The currency used in Part 2 is experimental points. Each experimental point is 
worth 15 pence. All earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be anonymous. 
It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any 
kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
 
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked to make 15 decisions. For each line in the table 
in the next page there is a paired choice between two options ("Option A" and "Option B"). Only 
one of these 15 lines will be used in the end to determine your earnings. You will only know which 
one at the end of the experiment. 
Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention to the choice you make 
in every line. At the end of the experiment a computerized random number (between 1 and 15) 
determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the paid line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that 
line, you will receive £1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either £2 or £0. To 
determine your earnings in the case you chose option B there will be second computerized random 
number (between 1 and 20). 
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Instructions for Part 2 
 
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen participants 
in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the same two participants. All 
groups of three participants act independently of each other. 
This part of the experiment will be repeated at least 20 times. From the 20th round onwards, in 
each round there is a one in five (20%) chance that the experiment will end. 
 
Instruction: 
 
You are in the role of a firm that is in a market with two other firms. 
In each round, you will have to choose a price for your product. This price must be one of the 
following prices: 
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102. 
You will only sell the product if your price is the lowest of the three prices chosen by you and the 
other two firms in that round. If you sell the product, your earnings are equal to the difference 
between the price and the cost, which is 90: 
Earnings = Price -- 90. 
If you do not sell the product, you will not get any earnings but you do not have costs either. If two 
or more firms sell at the same lowest price, the earnings will be shared equally between them. After 
your price choice, you will be told whether you have selected the lowest price as well as the price 
of the other firms. Before you choose your price, you can decide to agree with the other firms to 
set the highest price of 102 and share the earnings. This agreement is only valid if all three firms 
want to agree on it. However, the price agreement is not binding and firms are not required to set 
the agreed price. 
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The price agreement may be discovered by the computer. In that case, a fine of 8 points has to be 
paid. The computer can detect it in one out of 10 cases (a chance of 10%). 
A price agreement remains valid -- and can be discovered-- as long as it has not been discovered 
in a previous round. Once this has happened, you will not be fined in the future, unless you make 
a price agreement again. 
 
At the end of each round, you will be told 
•   the earnings you made in this round 
•   in case you agreed on a price if this agreement has been detected. 
 
Final Payment: 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 40 points = 6 GBP. The 
earnings you earned in each round minus any fine that you paid will be converted into cash. Each 
point is worth 15 pence, and we will round up the final payment to the next 10 pence. We guarantee 
a minimum earning of 2 GBP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
